09-27-2006 Council Agenda - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

The Honorable Steve Smith December 1, 2003 Page 6 certain regulatory control of streets and roads within their botnidaries, they are plainly precluded from creating their own enforcement systems inconsistent with those prescribed by statute. 3. Given our response to the second question, it Is unnecessary to address whether local administrative enforcement systems conflict with state laws in the particular menu of providing for keeping records of traffic violations.. It is lik rly, however, that the need fur uniform and consistent implementation of suchprograms is one reason for the strong legislative assertion of state preemption in the arca of traffic regulation_ 4. A number of Minnesota statutes and criminal ccdure rules make a provision for pre - trial, or presentev ing, "diversion" programs. SNP, e . Minn. Stat. §§ 388.24, 401.065 (2002), 628.69, 30.03, Minn. R. Crim.. ?roc. Rule 27.05. In particular, in the case of a traffic violation, Minn_ Stat § 169.89, subd. S autharize-s a trial cote to require, as part of or in lieu of other penalties, that convicted persons attend a driver.impro ement clinic. All such programs, however, require that a trial court make the determination aS to whether ante dance at such a clinic is appropriate. We are aware of no express authority fofr local officials to create a pretrial diversion program. 5. For the reasons set forth in Op. Atty. Gen. General's Office dots not generally address the cons-drollov established procedures. Thus, we are unable to determine tt administrative "hearing procedures' that might be established 29a, May 9, 1975, the Attorney 6ty of statutes or govcrwnentally constitutional validity of various y cities. I note, however, based on the materials you su�b'�tted, the majority of the local administrative penalty previsions do not appear to provide for�any administrative hearing process at all. Rather, they state that persons who contest their. li aljjility or refuse to pay the assessed penalty or complete the required training will be charged throtkgb the normal judicial channels. It appears that all the programs to which you refer are entirely wlur mry in that the accused may. _ N„- withdraw from the process at any time prior to payment of e city penalty. Given the elective fr nature of these processes, it is likely that the due pros ss rights of the accused ate not d °'`, jeopardized. 6. Likewise, a completely voluntary process ould not appear to offend the separation of powers principles embodied in the constituti• . or to encroach upon the judicial function. In Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720 1999), the court indicated that evaluation of administrative bearing schemes under the aep. 'tier] of powers doctrine involves consideration of, inter alia existence of adequate judicial ch: , appealability and voluntariness of entry into the administrative process. Id. at 725. Furth ore, as the court pointed cut in concluding that the role of the administrative board was bot judicial in nature in Mearh.v. Harrnful Substance Compensation Board, 550 N.W.2d 275 (1996): - 1 4 - . tar