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IILI . J•"/I lYUJ Mr. Jeff Smyser March 19, 2004 Paget zoning ordinance while a variance permits property to be used in a manner that is prohibited by ordinance by varying the terms of the ordinance. Barton Contracting, supra. A decision to approve or deny a CLIP application must be based upon the standards set forth in the zoning ordinance, Corwine v. Crow Wing County, 244 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1976). Implicit in a decision to approve a CUP is a finding that all requirements for the CUP have been satisfied, Corwine, supra; Barton, supra; Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles County, 617 N. W 2d 566 (Minn. 2000). To deny a CUP application, there must be a finding that the CUP does not satisfy one or more of the standards set forth in the ordinance and that issuance of the CUP would be an abuse of discretion. Corwine, supra; Schwartz, supra. A finding by the Council that the CUP application violates any one of the standards set forth in the ordinance is sufficient to deny the application. However, a denial should identify all of the standards (with factual support) that the Council finds to be violated. Here is why, for exarnple. If the Council determines to deny a CUP because it violates standard number 1, then implicit in that finding is that the CUP satisfies the remaining standards. Should the denial then be reviewed by the Courts and the Courts conclude that standard number 1 was not violated, then the CUP is automatically granted because, again, implicit in the decision by the City Council is the conclusion that the CUP application satisfied the other standards. If the Council determines to deny the CUP because it fails to satisfy standards 1, 2 and 3, again for example, then the denial would be upheld if only one of the standards violations were deemed justified, See Interstate Power Co., supra, citing Earth Burners, Inc. v. County of Carlton, 513 MW.2d 460 (Minn. 1994). The cases make clear that Courts apply a more deferential standard of review to CUP approvals than to CUP denials. Schwartz, supra; Interstate Power Co., supra; and Corwine,. supra. See, also, Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Scree, 220 N.W2d 306 (Minn. 1975). ( "...since zoning laws are a restriction on the use of private property...there is a heavier burden required on the part of those who challenge the approval of a conditional use permit, as compared to the degree of proof required of a landowner whose application is denied°) (emphasis in original). A couple of other points from the Marty letter should be addressed. First, if the Council determines to approve the CUP, then as I said, implicit in that determination Is 'a finding that the standards set forth in the ordinance have been satisfied. Consequently, it is not necessary to amend the comprehensive plan.