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upon us —the rise of the West in the i5th century and the rise of America in the tgth century <br />being the two previous sea changes. <br />But Zakaria added that this transition is defined less by American decline than by "the rise of <br />the rest." We're to look forward to a world economy, he wrote, "defined and directed from <br />many places and by many peoples." That's surely true. Yet the course of events since <br />Stembriick's remarks should give pause to those who believe the mantle of global leadership <br />will soon be passed. The crisis has exposed deep structural problems, not just in the U.S. but <br />worldwide. Europe's model of banking has proved no more resilient than America's, and <br />China has shown that it remains every bit the codependent partner of the United States. The <br />Dow, down more than a third last year, was actually among the world's better -performing <br />stock -market indices. Foreign capital has flooded into the U.S., which apparently remains a <br />safe haven, at least for now, in uncertain times. <br />It is possible that the United States will enter a period of accelerating relative decline in the <br />coming years, though that's hardly a foregone conclusion —a subject I'll return to later. <br />What's more certain is that the recession, particularly if it turns out to be as long and deep as <br />many now fear, will accelerate the rise and fall of specific places urithin the U.S.—and reverse <br />the fortunes of other cities and regions. <br />By what they destroy, what they leave standing, what responses they catalyze, and what space <br />they clear for new growth, most big economic shocks ultimately leave the economic <br />landscape transformed. Some of these transformations occur faster and more violently than <br />others. The period after the Great Depression saw the slow but inexorable rise of the suburbs. <br />The economic malaise of the ig7os, on the other hand, found its embodiment in the <br />vertiginous fall of older industrial cities of the Rust Belt, followed by an explosion of growth <br />in the Sun Belt. <br />The historian Scott Reynolds Nelson has noted that in some respects, today's crisis most <br />closely resembles the `Long Depression," which stretched, by one definition, from 1873 to <br />t896. Itbegan as a banking crisis brought on by insolvent mortgages and complex financial <br />instruments, and quickly spread to the real economy, leading to mass unemployment that <br />reached 25 percent in New York. <br />During that crisis, rising industries like railroads, petroleum, and steel were consolidated, old <br />ones failed, and the way was paved for a period of remarkable innovation and industrial <br />growth. In 1870, New England mill towns like Lowell, Lawrence, Manchester, and <br />3 <br />