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)rnstein 11 pay the estimated market value of manufactured homes to ain owners exceeds the authority of the statute. Ordinances, like statutes, are presumed valid. They are not to be overturned unless clearly invalid. City of St. Paul v. Kekedakis, 293 Minn. 334, 199 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1972). Keeping that in mind, the "lack of explicit statement in the statute may hinder, but does not prevent, ascertainment of the meaning. Often, . . . a statute speaks as plainly by inference and by means of the purposes which underlie it as in any other manner." State by Ervin v. Goodman, 206 Minn. 203, 207-08, 288 N.W. 157 (1939). A statutory requirement encompasses "all such - incidental, collateral, and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms." Id. at 208. This rule of construction is applicable to the interpretation of the scope of authority granted in Minn. Stat. 5 327C.095. The statute is broad in its grant of authority to municipalities to require "additional compensation." Given this broad authority, the ordinance provision requiring park purchasers to pay to homeowners the estimated market value of their homes in limited circumstances may be fairly and logically inferred from the terms of the statute. That the ordinance provides a cap on total compensation to homeowners of twenty percent of the purchase price of a park appears to reflect the mitigation purpose of the statute rather than an allowance for a windfall to homeowners. Consequently, it is fair to say that the ordinance, on its face, falls within the scope of authority of the statute. It is possible, however, that in its application to a given set of circumstances, the ordinance may not be a reasonable _ exercise of the express purpose of the additional compensation provision of the statute. Finally, you ask whether the city ordinance passed pursuant to Minn. Stat. S 327C.095 violates the taking provisions of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions.5 The same ad hoc factual inquiry as I described above with respect to the statute would apply to the ordinance as well. Therefore, as with the question of the statute's constitutionality under the taking clause, I am unable to give a concrete opinion as to whether the 5/ As I indicated with respect to the statute, a claim under the federal constitution would likely be premature until state remedies are exhausted. Williamson, 473 U.S. 172.