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93 16:17 H(01ES Z Gf•'RVEN 140 Minn. 353 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES house—ue situated. In 1918 Edward Brewer, plaintiff David Brewers father and a well-known local artist, moved the former damkeeper's house from the bank of the Mississippi River to the property and placed it on a foundation he had construct- ed. Brewer then had a carriage house built Although Brewer had secured a per- mit for the construction of the foundation of the main house, it appears that he built the carriage house without a building per mil A 1922 assessors card is, however, attached to the foundation permit. The assessor's card variously identifies the car• riage house as a single dwelling/studio with a toilet and a "studio apt. & gar." Until Edward Brewers death in 1971, the carriage house bad served primarily as the artist's studio. The apartment had been used as living quarters only during a peri- od in the 1920's when workmen used it as part time housing and, again, from 1989 to 1941 when David Brewer resided there while attending college. In 1969 a fire caused severe internal damage to the carriage house. Restoration work, accomplished without a building per mil was completed about the time of Ed' ward Brewers death. David Brewer pur- chased the property in 1971 and from that time forward the carriage house has served u the residence of a succession of tenants. The carriage house was further improved pursuant to a 1975 building permit author- izing the alteration of "existing sarvant's quarters," On December 13. 1916, the zoning classi- fication of the property was changed from duplex to R-3 single family residence. In 1981 Brewer applied for a certificate of legal nonconforming use for the carriage house. In the application he affirmed that the present use of the property had been in existence more than 20 years. The zoning administrator approved the application. One of Brewer's neighbors requested re view of the administrator's decision purau- ant to SL Paul Zoning Code 4 64,203 (1981), and a public heanng was held. The board of zoning appeals concluded that the prop coy taus not cnutlyd to lawful norconform• P.7 ing use status and reversed the adminlstraa tars ruling. The board's determination was affirmed by the St. Paul City Council and ultimately by the district court- (1,2) It is a fundamental principle of the law of real property that uses lawfully existing at the time of an adverse zoning change may continue to exist until they are removed or otherwise discontinued. SA I: McQullin, Municipal Corporations, 5 26: 18o (ad ed. 1976). As we held in County of Freeborn v. Claussen, 295 Minn. 96, 99, 203 N.W.2d 323, 325 0912), "CR) residential zoning ordinance may constitutionally Pro- hibit the creation of uses which are noncon- forming, but existing nonconforming uses must either be permitted to remain or be elimirated by use of eminent domain", cit- ing Hawkins r. Talbot, 248 Minn. 549, 80 N.W.2d 868 (1957). (3) In keeping with this principle, the St. Paul Zoning Cade includes this Starr ment in its general provisions: "It is the intent of this code to permit legal noncon- forming - - ' uses existing on the effec- tive date of this code or amendment there- to, to continue until they are removed but not to encourage their survival." St Paul Zoning Code 4 62.102, aubd. 1 (1981). This section also creates a presumption that a use is a legally nonconforming use if it is demonstrated by clear and convincing 06 dense either that the use wax established pursuant to building permits issued by the city or that the use had been in existence continuously for at least 20 years prior to the effective date of rezoning. The district court construed this provi- sion to preclude the continuance of any nonconforming use except a use which e'r• ther had been established pursuant to a building permit or had existed for 20 years. Such a restrictive construction. however, casts grave doubt on the validity of the zoning code because it fails to honor the constitutional protection afforded existing uses. County of Freeborn v. Clatusm, supra. Moreover, reference to other see - dons of the zoning code confirms that 4 62.102, aubd. 1, simply creates a pre- sumption that certain nonconforming uses