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• • i) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests, ii) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct as specifically defined by the applicable state law, and, iii) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. In the recent case of Pone v. Illinois decided in 1987 the Court refined this definition further by noting that the third "prong" of the test must be decided without reference to a particular community's standards. The proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given community would find serious value in the allegedly obscene material, but whether a "reasonable person" in any community would find such value in the material taken as whole. Both the Minnesota Statutes and the local Rochester ordinance employ the language of the Miller standard in their definitions of what constitutes ' criminally obscene or pornographic materials and activities. Because the suppression of obscenity is a limitation on a fundamental right of free expression within our society, it is very narrowly interpreted. That fact combined with the ambiguity of any definition of obscenity ensures that a great many sexually explicit materials or types of performances which are not "obscene" in the constitutional sense are nevertheless offensive to certain elements of the population. -The temptation to public'-officials confronted— with such reactions is therefore to attempt to use other governmental (eg. zoning) powers to indirectly limit free speech activities in a way which the courts have said it is constitutionally impermissible to directly limit. In such cases the courts have not hesitated to look beyond the professed intent of the legislation to ascertain the affect which such proposed regulations actually have on constitutionally protected activities. C. Regulatory Technicues With the limiting constitutional considerations in mind, we can now turn to an PY�TT12*� " _- .a on of same-of the regulatory techniques which have in recent years i been found to be constitutionally permissible. 1. Regulation of Secondary Effects The courts have recognized the rights of carmunities to condition the exercise of certain First Amendment activities by what have been referred to as "content neutral" regulations. These regulations have tended to focus on the "secondary effects" generated by various adult oriented businesses. Examples of such secondary effects would be the congestion caused by the business, the effect which it has on crime in the vicinity, the effect on property values in the area, vagrancy problems, and various other blighting and adverse impacts on the adjacent area. By analogy to traditional zoning concerns, the courts have recognized that the police powers (ie. the power to regulate for the health, safety or general welfare) granted to local government include not simply the power to eliminate filth, stench and unhealthy places, but also the powers to establish zones where family values, youth values and the blessing of quiet seclusion and clean air "make the area a sanctuary for people." J. Powell, concurring in Yours v. American Mini-Theatres (1976) . Such