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1 <br /> Justice Stevens did not expressly describe the standard he had used, but it was • <br /> clear that the plurality would afford non-obscene sexually explicit speech lesser First <br /> Amendment protection than other categories of speech. However, four dissenters and <br /> one concurring justice concluded that the degree of protection afforded speech by the <br /> First Amendment does not vary with the social value ascribed to that speech. In his <br /> concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that the four-part test of United States v. <br /> O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679 (1968), should apply. Powell <br /> explained: <br /> Under that test, a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its <br /> incidental impact upon First Amendment interests, "if it is within the <br /> constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or <br /> substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to <br /> the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on . . . <br /> First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of <br /> that interest." <br /> 427 U.S. at 79-80, 96 S.Ct. at 2457 (citation omitted), (Powell, J., concurring). <br /> i <br /> •Perhaps because Justice • Stevens' plurality opinion did not offer a clearly <br /> articulated standard of review, post-Young courts often applied the O'Brien test <br /> advocated by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion. Many ordinances regulating <br /> sexually oriented businesses were invalidated under the O'Brien test. See R.M. Stein, <br /> ( Regulation of Adult Businesses Through Zoning After Renton, 18 Pac. LJ. 351, 360 <br /> (1987) ("consistently invalidated"); S.A. Bender, Regulating Pornography Tnrouch <br /> Zoning: Can We 'Clean Uo' Honolulu? 8 U. Haw. L. Rev. 75, 105 (1986) (ordinances <br /> -upheld in only about half the cases). <br /> Applying Young, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a zoning ordinance <br /> adopted by the city of Minneapolis. Alexander v. City of Minneacolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th <br /> Cir. 1983). In Alexander, the challenged ordinance had three major restrictions on <br /> sexually oriented businesses: distancing from specified uses, prevention of <br /> concentration and amortization. It prohibited a sexually oriented business from <br /> operating within 500 feet of districts zoned for residential or office-residences, a church, <br /> -32- <br />