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<br /> pality's administrative business, (See Anderson, There are a number of cases involving action
<br /> supra, pages 376-377; McQuillin, 3rd ed., vol. 5, expressly suspending rules (see County Court v.
<br /> sec. 15.07.) City of Grafton, 77 W. Va. 84, 86 S.E. 924, 1915)
<br /> and there is no doubt this action is ordinarily
<br /> Express statutory or charter provisions may valid; but it appears that when the council acts in
<br /> determine whether an ordinance or resolution derogation of a rule requiring several readings on
<br /> should be used in specific instances, but the an ordinance and its action indicates clearly that
<br /> general rules outlined above should be followed the council intended the vote to be the final
<br /> in the absence of any provisions in the law to passage of the ordinance, the rule is considered
<br /> the contrary. dispensed with or suspended for the action. Com-
<br /> monwealth v.Mayor of Lancaster, 5 Watts 152 (Pa.
<br /> In its traditional form a resolution begins with 1874); Schoenfeld v. City of Seattle, 265 Fed.
<br /> a "whereas" clause or clauses explaining the oc- 726 (D. Ct. 1020); cf. City of El Dorado v. Jacobs,
<br /> casion for the action,followed by the substance of 174 Ark. 98 294 S.W. 411 (1927), It has been
<br /> the resolution beginning with "Therefore, be it held, however, that where a statute does not it-
<br /> resolved" or some similar phrase distinguishing self provide the procedure, an ordinance adopting
<br /> the action from "The council ordains" enacting rules has all the force of a statute and cannot be
<br /> clause of the ordinance. In more recent practice, repealed, suspended or waived except by action of
<br /> the preamble is omitted and the material set- equal formality. Swindell v. State, 143 Ind. 153,
<br /> ting out the backgound or occasion is given as 42 N.E. 528, 35 L.R.A. 50 (1895); see also Blood
<br /> a separately numbered paragraph or section of the v. Beal, 100 Me. 30, 60 AtI, 427 (1905), holding
<br /> body of the resolution. that where rules and orders of the city council
<br /> provide that certain orders should not be passed
<br /> A formal resolution implies the reduction of the without a two-thirds vote of the whole member-
<br /> proposition to writing before the question is put ship and the number voting for a particular order
<br /> upon its passage. Where a resolution is required by was 10 out of 21, the order was void for want of
<br /> statute, probably a formal resolution is meant. the requisite number of votes. A reading of all
<br /> However, proceedings simply in the form of a the cases, however, indicates that this line of
<br /> motion duly carried and entered on record are decisions, if sound, is of doubtful application to
<br /> frequently held to be equivalent to a resolution the Minnesota situation. Under the Minnesota
<br /> and probably this is sufficient for most simple provisions cited at the beginning of this memoran-
<br /> administrative acts. dum, it seems doubtful in the light of these decis-
<br /> ions generally that a by-law or ordinance requiring
<br /> Effect of Passage of Ordinances and Resolutions two or more readings on ordinances could be
<br /> in Derogation of Council Rules given such effect that an ordinance passed without
<br /> complying with the rule is void.
<br /> There have been no Minnesota cases involv-
<br /> ing the effect of council action taken in derogra- Proceedings taking place at a council meeting
<br /> tion of council rules, but the decisions elsewhere which was not a regular or adjourned meeting or
<br /> generally indicate that an ordinance actually a- a duly called special meeting, were a nullity and
<br /> dopted by a municipal council in accordance not enforceable. (A.G. Op. 471e, Mar. 11, 1959.)
<br /> with-statute- is not invalid because its own rules
<br /> of procedure were not complied with. 56 Am. Effective Date
<br /> Jur. (2d), "Municipal Corporations", Sec. 156;
<br /> McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, (3d ed.), Statutory city ordinances cannot become opera-
<br /> vol. 4, sec. 13.42; Greeley v. Hamman, 17 Colo, tive or go into effect until they are published.
<br /> 30, 28 Pac. 460 (1891); McGraw v. Whitson, Ordinances which are not published are void and
<br /> 69 Ia. 348, 28 N.W. 632 (1886);City of Sedalia v. cannot be enforced. Publication must be made
<br /> Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S.W. 276 (1904); in the official newspaper of the city. Before an
<br /> Ex parte The Mayor, etc. of Albany, 23 Wend, ordinance takes effect, it may be revoked or
<br /> 280 (N.Y. 1840); Madden v. Smeltz, 1 Ohio. repealed by the city council by motion, resolution
<br /> Cir. Dec. 424 (1887); Hutcheson v. Storrie, 48 or ordinance. (Union Public Service Co. v. the
<br /> S.W. 785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898); Bennett v. New Village of Minneota, 212 Minn. 92, 2 N.W. 2d,
<br /> Bedford, 110 Mass.433 (1872);Holt v. City Coun- 555, 1942; see also McQuillin, vol. 5, 3rd ed.,
<br /> cil of Summerville, 127 Mass. 408 (1879); South sections 16.76 - 16.78.) If an ordinance is void
<br /> Georgia Power Co. v. Baumann, 169 Ga. 649, because publication requirements are not met,
<br /> 151 S.E. 513 (1929). The last three cases involve a council cannot later pass another ordinance
<br /> action taken in violation of provisions in the rules retroactively effective as of the date when the
<br /> requiring more than one reading. other ordinance would have been effective had it
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