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3) The regulation reaches no further than necessary to ac- NONCONFORMING E SPECIAL
<br /> SE GNOS
<br /> complish the public purposes.
<br /> Obviously,a community cannot obliterate nonconform-
<br /> Communities defending sign regulations have justified ing signs through the simple enactment of a new set of sign
<br /> them on the basis of the two public purposes identified regulations. To do so without full compensation to the
<br /> above—traffic safety and aesthetics.Traffic safety is broadly owners is clearly a violation of the Fifth Amendment pro-
<br /> accepted as a reasonable ground for sign regulation by scription on government taking of private property for
<br /> courts. Some require proof of the traffic issues involved; public use without just compensation.At the same time,it
<br /> others, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have basically is doubtful that the objectives of the new regulation can ever
<br /> taken judicial notice of the traffic safety concerns of sign con- be achieved if nonconforming signs are allowed to remain.
<br /> trots. The technique most often used to address this problem is
<br /> Although some courts reject aesthetics as grounds for sign amortization.Amortization,as described in more depth at
<br /> regulation,most,including the U.S.Supreme Court,also ac- the end of Chapter 1, is the process of permitting the non-
<br /> cept these grounds for sign regulation.The aesthetic grounds conforming sign to remain for a specified period of time at
<br /> for regulation have some advantage in proof because,with the end of which the sign must either be modified to conform
<br /> any kind of reasonable study and findings,a community can with the ordinance or removed.
<br /> urge that"beauty is in the eye of the beholder"and run lit- A significant majority of courts have found amortization
<br /> tle risk of a court second-guessing the aesthetic findings. to be a constitutional means of addressing the problem of
<br /> Certainly,the design and structural classifications of signs nonconformance. However, in some states, state statutes
<br /> can be justified on both safety and aesthetic grounds.How- prohibit amortization of nonconforming uses, or noncon-
<br /> ever, justifying content-based classifications on aesthetic forming signs in particular.
<br /> and safety grounds is considerably more difficult and, in The basic legal issue is whether the amortization provi-
<br /> most cases,probably impossible.The issue that most plan- sions of a particular regulation strike the proper balance be-
<br /> ners and others drafting local sign regulations miss is that a tween public gain and private loss such that the
<br /> purple-and-orange-striped.political sign is every bit as governmental action either does not amount to a taking or
<br /> distracting to a driver and every bit as ugly to those who do the amortization period that allows the owner to recoup a
<br /> not like purple and orange as a purple-and-orange-striped portion(or all)of his investment amounts to just compen-
<br /> business sign at the same location. sation.The courts generally try to determine the reasonable-
<br /> The aspects of signs that affect traffic safety and aesthetics ness of amortization provisions—whether they are
<br /> are sign size,scale,height,location,material,lighting,color, constitutional,no matter how applied,and whether they are
<br /> and motion, or lack thereof—not content. Thus, any ra- constitutional as applied in a particular situation.In deter-
<br /> tional examination of the legal authority for sign regulations mining whether a provision is reasonable, courts look at
<br /> suggests that any distinctions among sign types based on several factors, including the type or nature of the sign,its
<br /> content are highly suspect on simple factual grounds.For ex- location,the extent to which the owner's business is affected,
<br /> ample,in City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Associa- the cost of the sign,its salvage value and depreciated value,
<br /> Lion, 634 P.2d 52 (1981), the Colorado Supreme Court its fair-market value, and its remaining useful life.
<br /> struck down the Lakewood sign code as unconstitutional There is no rule of law that dictates how long the amor-
<br /> because it found that the city had attempted to distinguish tization period must be.Periods ranging from three to five
<br /> between signs that allowed listing of identification,location, years have generally been upheld. In Major Media of the
<br /> product,and price information for a business,which were Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 621 F.Supp. 1446
<br /> permitted in certain zones,and signs such as Help Wanted, (E.D.N.C.1985),Aff'd 792 F.2d 1269(4th Cir.1986),cert.
<br /> which were prohibited in those zones.The court said: denied,107 S.Ct.1334(1987),the court upheld a five-and-
<br /> We conclude that the relationship between the content regula- one-half-year amortization period. It rejected the owner's
<br /> tions imposed on commercial advertising . . . and claim that the regulation would destroy the company,noting
<br /> Lakewood's safety and aesthetic purposes is too attenuated to the extensive business the company had outside of the city
<br /> justify the resulting infringement of First Amendment of Raleigh.It also considered the fact that the owner's leases
<br /> freedoms.(634 P2d at 64) allowed for termination,without further obligation,in the
<br /> event that governmental action forced removal of the sign.
<br /> It is hazardous(if not fatal),in a legal sense,for a planner Using the exact same analysis,the court in Georgia Out-
<br /> or public official defending sign regulations to testify that the door Advertising,Inc.,v. City of Waynesville,690 F.Supp.
<br /> regulations were adopted to maintain traffic safety and com- 452(W.D.N.C.1988),ruled that a four-and-one-half-year
<br /> munity appearance when this witness is unable to relate amortization period was insufficient.It ruled that the amor-
<br /> those public'purposes to sign prohibitions that are based on tization period allowed for in the ordinance, which pro-
<br /> sign content. hibited all billboards, did not prevent a taking of the sign
<br /> In short,-in a well-litigated case,an attorney for the owner owner's property requiring just compensation.Another fact
<br /> of a sign that falls into one of the less preferred,more heavily leading to the ruling was that the sign owner's lease did not
<br /> regulated classes of signs can challenge local sign regulations allow termination and, in fact, required payment of rent
<br /> by showing that the classifications in the regulations bear lit- beyond the amortization period.The court also decided that
<br /> tle or no rational relationship to the stated purposes of the the sign owner's business might be destroyed by the regula-
<br /> regulations. For totally separate reasons, the multiple tion.It was significant that the city offered no evidence that
<br /> classifications of signs based on content complicates the en- the ban on billboards would further its interest in protecting
<br /> forcement and administration of sign regulations as well. the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.
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