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17 <br /> <br />organized, found a nonprofit to represent them and seek financing, and were ready to promptly <br />pay $1 million in earnest money. Yet, Defendants refused to recognize the exercised right based <br />on several improper rationales. First, they claimed that the exercise was inadequate because it <br />would result in a later closing date, uncertainty over the financing contingency, and a new round <br />of inspections. As explained above, such a rationale, if accepted, would deny park residents the <br />right to beneficial contingencies afforded to the buyer-developer and would foreclose park <br />residents from ever enjoying “the same terms and conditions” as those provided to the buyer- <br />developer. This would clearly subvert legislative intent. <br />Second, Defendants claimed that Plaintiffs did not prove before the 45-day deadline that <br />Aeon was authorized to purchase. But that is plainly not a requirement of subdivision 6—which <br />only requires that the right be exercised by a “nonprofit . . . which has” permission of owners <br />from a majority of homes. If it were imposed now, it would effectively shorten the 45-day <br />window the Legislature carefully designed to permit residents to evaluate the offer and exercise <br />the right.7 Defendants’ claim also lacks merit because they refused to engage in discussion over <br />their purported disputes regarding Aeon’s authority, and instead rushed to close at least two days <br />before their own deadline. Their claim is further contradicted by the terms of their own Purchase <br />Agreement allowing Continental until closing to produce “such consents and authorizations as <br />reasonably necessary to evidence Buyer’s authority to purchase the Property.” Yet another <br />section provided that inadvertencies related to documents would be subject to reasonable <br />assurances and supplements before or after closing. These terms were denied to park residents. <br />                                                             <br />7 Engrafting such a requirement would surely add complications. A household member may not be the <br />“owner” but may have authority to provide “written permission” for the owner. Also, determining “ownership” <br />may require thorny consideration of records, legal questions, and factual issues. 98 DUNNEL MINN. DIGEST <br />PROPERTY § 1.04 (stating various definitions in Minnesota caselaw of “ownership, “the fact-intensive nature of <br />the inquiry, and that a “presumption of ownership arising from a certificate of title can be rebutted”). <br />27-CV-16-9809 Filed in Fourth Judicial District Court <br />8/5/2016 8:53:55 AM <br />Hennepin County, MN