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26 <br />sampling tobacco products." Therefore, in the absence of any other limitation, the Clear . <br />Indoor Air Act does allow the type of conduct at issue in this case. <br />i <br />However, the Clean Indoor Air Act also contains a provision which allows local <br />governments to more strictly control tobacco use within a local jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. <br />§ 144,417, subd. 4(a) provides, "Nothing in sections 144.414 to 144.417 prohibits a <br />statutory or home rule charter city or county from enacting and enforcing more ,stringent <br />measures to protect individuals from secondhand smoke." (Emphasis added). <br />Defendant argues that the phrase "more stringent measures" does not allow a local <br />jurisdiction such as St. Anthony to enact an outright ban on sampling tobacco products in <br />a tobacco shop. <br />The object of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the <br />legislature. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2010); Weiler v. Ritchie, 788 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn. <br />2010). When a court attempts to interpret a statute, it must not do so by examining its <br />provisions in isolation. Rather, a statute must be considered, "as a whole." State v. <br />Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011). Furthermore, "words and sentences are <br />understood... in the light of their context." Irl., citing Christensen v. I-lennepin Transp. <br />Co., Inc., 215 Minn. 394, 409, 10 N.W.2d 406, 415 (1943), "A statute should be <br />interpreted, whenever possible, to give effect to all of its provisions, and `no word, <br />phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant."' State v. <br />Larivee, 656 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2003) citing Baker v. Ploetz, 616 N.W.2d 263, 269 <br />(Minn. 2000) (quoting Amaral v. Saint Cloud flosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999). <br />M <br />