Laserfiche WebLink
showing that the property owner would like to use their property in a reasonable manner that is prohibited <br />by ordinance. Id; see also Sagstetter v. City of Saint Paul, 529 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Minn. App. 1995) <br />(applying reasonable use standard). Rowell makes clear that the three statutory requirements for granting <br />a variance under the undue hardship standard are (1) reasonableness, (2) unique circumstances and (3) <br />essential character of the locality. Rowell, 446 N.W.2d at 922. <br />First, we must evaluate the reasonableness of the requested variances against the fact that the city <br />previously granted the Perkins a number of variances in 1989. The newer variances granted in 1999 bring <br />the property closer to compliance with the conditions allowed by the official controls. The city's findings <br />number eight through thirteen listed the ways in which the 1999 variances vary less from code provisions <br />than the 1989 variances. The reasonableness analysis might differ if the city had approved a request that <br />was further from the original ordinance rather than more compliant. But here the variance request is <br />reasonable because it is in keeping with the spirit and intent of the ordinance. See Merriam Park <br />Community Council, Inc. v. McDonough, 297 Minn. 285, 291, 210 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1973) overruled on <br />other grounds, Northwestern Collete v. City ofAdren Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 868 n.4 (Minn. 1979). <br />Second, there is no dispute that the land has unique circumstances. The unique circumstances of the <br />Perkins property were detailed in the city's finding number 15 and 16- -the property is located at the end of <br />a cul -de -sac, and has a stand of trees and a significant grade change of 44 feet. This finding reasonably <br />supports the city's conclusion that unique circumstances justify granting the variances. Appellants argue, <br />however, that the Perkins plight is of their own making and that their purpose in requesting variances is <br />purely to increase resale value. Appellants seemingly ignore that the Perkins already had the 1989 <br />variances and platting, and that the requested 1999 variances were arrived at after working with city staff <br />over a period of months. <br />The third statutory requirement is that the variances not alter the essential character of the locality. The <br />city's finding number fourteen was that the proposed use is in keeping with the character of the locality. <br />Appellants, however, contend that the average lot size in the neighborhood is 1.556 acres and protest <br />that one lot under the 1999 configuration is only .62 acres. How the one undersized lot significantly alters <br />the essential character of the neighborhood is not entirely clear. Appellants also protest the loss of open <br />space, but the 1999 plan preserves as much, if not more, open space than the prior 1989 plan. <br />In sum, because the city's findings adequately addressed the three statutory requirements as described in <br />Rowell, the statutory standard was satisfied. <br />b. Arbitrary and Capricious <br />Appellants further argue that the variances were granted arbitrarily and capriciously in disregard of MPCA <br />rules and DNR requirements. But appellants can point to no governing rule or ordinance requiring MPCA <br />or DNR approval for the issuance of variances by a municipality. The MPCA does have sewage treatment <br />standards that have been adopted by the city, but no MPCA approval is required. Both the city and the <br />-31- <br />