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FINANCE AND COMMERCE APPELLATE COURTS EDITION MARCH 11, 1994 Appellants commenced this action seeking a declaratory judg- ment that respondents have either the duty or the authority to defend, — or to reimburse them for costs and attorney fees incurred to defend, an action alleging that appellants violated the open meeting law. The trial court granted summary judgment for respondents. The trial court also granted $500 in attorney fees for each respondent. We.affirm the grant of attorney fees, but otherwise reverse and remand, FACTS . Appellants were defendants in an actioni brought by an Afton resident against the mayor of Afton and two city council members 'in both their personal and official capacities. Thuma v, Kroschel, 506 N.W.2d 14,16 (Minn. App.1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Dec,.14, 1993) (the Thuma action). This action is a derivative of that action. At all relevant times, appellant Jon S. Kroschel was the mayor of the City of Afton; and appellants Suzanne Flinch and Nicholas Mucciacciaro were members of the Afton City Council. Count I of the Thuma complaint alleged that by holding a closed meeting during which they deliberated and approved a contract for the repair of the well in Afton Square Town Park, appellants violated the Minnesota Open Meeting Law, Minn, Stat. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1990). Count II alleged that the mayor's action in approving the contract under "emergency powers" was ultra vires because the mayor has no "emergency powers." Count III alleged that failure to obtain two quotations for the emergency well -drilling contract violated the Uniform Municipal Contracting Law, Minn. Stat. § .471.345, subd. 5 (1990). The Thuma complaint sought a "civil penalty" against each individual defendant in the amount of $100 for each separate viola- tion of.the open meeting law. It also sought to have appellants removed from office because of multiple violations of the open meeting law. It did not seek compensatory 'damages or punitive damages and the city was not a party to the suit. The trial court found that each appellant violated the open meeting law on one occasion; that Mayor Kroschel acted ultra vires in executing the contract without authority of the city council; but that appellants had not violated the Uniform Municipal Contracting Act. For the open meeting violation, the trial court imposed a $100 "civil penalty" on each appellant pursuant to Minn. Star. § 471.705, subd 2.(1900y.. On appeal, this coumaffirmed the ruling that appellants violated the open meeting law: Tbuma Y. Kroschel 506 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. App.1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Dec.14,1993). This court concluded, however, that the trial court did not have jurisdic- tion to decide the ultra vices issue on the merits. Id. at 21. While the Thuma action was pending, appellants commenced this declaratory judgment action againstthe city and the Minnesota League of Cities Insurance Trust (MLCIT). Appellants assert that respondent city was obligated to provide them a defense in the Thuma action pursuant to either Minn. Stat. § 466.07 (1990) (indemnification for municipal employee liability) or Minn. Star. § 465.76 (1990) (reimbursement to municipal employee for costs and attorney fees incurred in the, defense of charges of a "criminal nature"). Appellants also assert that respondent MLCIT, a self -in- suring -pool operated for the benefit of Minnesota municipalities, owes them a defense and reimbursement under the covenant issued to the city by MLCIT. Counsel for the city and MLCIT appeared at a first summary judgment motion hearing but the hearing was canceled when ap- pellantsadvised them that a stipulation for dismissal would be filed because the city council had voted to reimburse appellants, Within days, the council decision to reimburse appellants was rescinded,' and the summary judgment motion hearing was again noticed. At the rescheduled hearing, the city and MLCIT sought attorney fees because their counsel had to appear twice to argue the same sum- mary judgment motion. The trial court granted attorney fees in the sum of $500 for each respondent. At the hearing, the district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the city and MLCIT, dismissing with prejudice appellants' petition for declaratory relief. We affirm the award of attorney fees to respondents, but reverse the dismissal, and remand. ISSUES 1. Does the city have a duty under Minn. Star, § 466.07 (1990) to defend the Thuma action, or to reimburse for costs and attorneys fees incurred by appellants to defend the action? 2. May the city under Minn. Stat. § 465.76 (1990) reimburse appellants for costs and attorney fees incurred to defend the Thuma action? 3, Is MLCIT obligated to provide coverage on behalf of the city pursuant to.the terms of the covenant it issued to the city? 4. Did the trial, court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees to each respondent in the amount of $5007 . ANALYSIS On appeal from summary judgment, this court must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Offerdahl Y. Univer- sity of Minn. Hasps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425,427 (1988). The parties agree that there are no material facts in dispute and that resolution of this case depends upon the legal determination of how statutes are applied to undisputed facts. This court owes no deference to the trial court's resolution of a legal issue. Queen v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 481 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Minn. App. 1992). "The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1990); accord Tuma v. Commissioner of Economic Sec,, 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn. 1986). When interpreting a statute, the court must examine the language of the statute and, "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that legisla- tive intention most ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." . Swenson Y. Emerson Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690,699 (Minn.1985) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm 'n Y. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 2056 (1980)), cert. denied, 476 U.S.1130 (1986). I The open meeting law requires that meetings of the governing body of any city shall generally be open to the public. Minn. Stat. §471.705, subd. 1 (1990), Any person who violates the open meeting law "shall be subject to personal liability in the form of a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $100 for a single occur. rence."' Minn. Star. § 471.705, subd. 2 (1990) (emphasis added). This court, has already held that appellants violated the open meeting law. Thuma; 506 N.W.2d at 19. We also affirmed that the, violation was unintentional. Id. . The Municipal Tort Liability Act peovides: Indemnification required. [Subject to the statutory max - \imums contained in -section 466.041, a municipality or an - instrumentality of a municipality shall defend and indem. nify any of its officers and employees, whether elective or appo ntive, for damages, including punitive damages,, claimed or levied against the officer or employee, provided that the officer or employee: . (1) was -acting in the performance of the duties of the position; and (2 was not guilty of malfeasance in office, willful neglect of?duty, or bad faith. Minn. Stat. § 466.07, subd.1 (1990) (emphasis added). The trial court concluded that the duty of a municipality to defend and indemnify' 'The claim here is for reimbursement of the costs of defense, not for indemnification of the $100 civil penalty. Its employees under section 466.07 does not extend to the Thuma action because that action, alleging violations of the open meeting law, was not a claim for "damages" or "punitive damages." The plaintiff in the Thuma action sought imposition of a "civil penalty" under Minn: Star. § 471.705, subd. 2 (1990). The trial court con- cluded that the "civil penalty" was not analogous to "damages," as referred to in section 466.07, and the duty of the city to defend its All opinions since 1989 can be faxed. Ca11883.4244 50