FINANCE AND COMMERCE APPELLATE COURTS EDITION MARCH 11, 1994
<br />Appellants commenced this action seeking a declaratory judg-
<br />ment that respondents have either the duty or the authority to defend,
<br />— or to reimburse them for costs and attorney fees incurred to defend,
<br />an action alleging that appellants violated the open meeting law.
<br />The trial court granted summary judgment for respondents. The
<br />trial court also granted $500 in attorney fees for each respondent.
<br />We.affirm the grant of attorney fees, but otherwise reverse and
<br />remand,
<br />FACTS .
<br />Appellants were defendants in an actioni brought by an Afton
<br />resident against the mayor of Afton and two city council members
<br />'in both their personal and official capacities. Thuma v, Kroschel,
<br />506 N.W.2d 14,16 (Minn. App.1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn.
<br />Dec,.14, 1993) (the Thuma action). This action is a derivative of
<br />that action.
<br />At all relevant times, appellant Jon S. Kroschel was the mayor of
<br />the City of Afton; and appellants Suzanne Flinch and Nicholas
<br />Mucciacciaro were members of the Afton City Council. Count I of
<br />the Thuma complaint alleged that by holding a closed meeting
<br />during which they deliberated and approved a contract for the repair
<br />of the well in Afton Square Town Park, appellants violated the
<br />Minnesota Open Meeting Law, Minn, Stat. § 471.705, subd. 1
<br />(1990). Count II alleged that the mayor's action in approving the
<br />contract under "emergency powers" was ultra vires because the
<br />mayor has no "emergency powers." Count III alleged that failure
<br />to obtain two quotations for the emergency well -drilling contract
<br />violated the Uniform Municipal Contracting Law, Minn. Stat. §
<br />.471.345, subd. 5 (1990).
<br />The Thuma complaint sought a "civil penalty" against each
<br />individual defendant in the amount of $100 for each separate viola-
<br />tion of.the open meeting law. It also sought to have appellants
<br />removed from office because of multiple violations of the open
<br />meeting law. It did not seek compensatory 'damages or punitive
<br />damages and the city was not a party to the suit.
<br />The trial court found that each appellant violated the open meeting
<br />law on one occasion; that Mayor Kroschel acted ultra vires in
<br />executing the contract without authority of the city council; but that
<br />appellants had not violated the Uniform Municipal Contracting Act.
<br />For the open meeting violation, the trial court imposed a $100 "civil
<br />penalty" on each appellant pursuant to Minn. Star. § 471.705, subd
<br />2.(1900y..
<br />On appeal, this coumaffirmed the ruling that appellants violated
<br />the open meeting law: Tbuma Y. Kroschel 506 N.W.2d 14, 19
<br />(Minn. App.1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Dec.14,1993). This
<br />court concluded, however, that the trial court did not have jurisdic-
<br />tion to decide the ultra vices issue on the merits. Id. at 21.
<br />While the Thuma action was pending, appellants commenced
<br />this declaratory judgment action againstthe city and the Minnesota
<br />League of Cities Insurance Trust (MLCIT). Appellants assert that
<br />respondent city was obligated to provide them a defense in the
<br />Thuma action pursuant to either Minn. Stat. § 466.07 (1990)
<br />(indemnification for municipal employee liability) or Minn. Star. §
<br />465.76 (1990) (reimbursement to municipal employee for costs and
<br />attorney fees incurred in the, defense of charges of a "criminal
<br />nature"). Appellants also assert that respondent MLCIT, a self -in-
<br />suring -pool operated for the benefit of Minnesota municipalities,
<br />owes them a defense and reimbursement under the covenant issued
<br />to the city by MLCIT.
<br />Counsel for the city and MLCIT appeared at a first summary
<br />judgment motion hearing but the hearing was canceled when ap-
<br />pellantsadvised them that a stipulation for dismissal would be filed
<br />because the city council had voted to reimburse appellants, Within
<br />days, the council decision to reimburse appellants was rescinded,'
<br />and the summary judgment motion hearing was again noticed. At
<br />the rescheduled hearing, the city and MLCIT sought attorney fees
<br />because their counsel had to appear twice to argue the same sum-
<br />mary judgment motion. The trial court granted attorney fees in the
<br />sum of $500 for each respondent.
<br />At the hearing, the district court also granted summary judgment
<br />in favor of the city and MLCIT, dismissing with prejudice
<br />appellants' petition for declaratory relief.
<br />We affirm the award of attorney fees to respondents, but reverse
<br />the dismissal, and remand.
<br />ISSUES
<br />1. Does the city have a duty under Minn. Star, § 466.07 (1990) to
<br />defend the Thuma action, or to reimburse for costs and attorneys
<br />fees incurred by appellants to defend the action?
<br />2. May the city under Minn. Stat. § 465.76 (1990) reimburse
<br />appellants for costs and attorney fees incurred to defend the Thuma
<br />action?
<br />3, Is MLCIT obligated to provide coverage on behalf of the city
<br />pursuant to.the terms of the covenant it issued to the city?
<br />4. Did the trial, court abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees
<br />to each respondent in the amount of $5007 .
<br />ANALYSIS
<br />On appeal from summary judgment, this court must determine
<br />whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the
<br />trial court erred in its application of the law. Offerdahl Y. Univer-
<br />sity of Minn. Hasps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425,427 (1988). The
<br />parties agree that there are no material facts in dispute and that
<br />resolution of this case depends upon the legal determination of how
<br />statutes are applied to undisputed facts. This court owes no
<br />deference to the trial court's resolution of a legal issue. Queen v.
<br />Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 481 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Minn. App. 1992).
<br />"The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to
<br />ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn. Stat.
<br />§ 645.16 (1990); accord Tuma v. Commissioner of Economic
<br />Sec,, 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn. 1986). When interpreting a
<br />statute, the court must
<br />examine the language of the statute and, "[a]bsent a clearly
<br />expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that legisla-
<br />tive intention most ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." .
<br />Swenson Y. Emerson Elec. Co., 374 N.W.2d 690,699 (Minn.1985)
<br />(quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm 'n Y. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
<br />447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 2056 (1980)), cert. denied, 476
<br />U.S.1130 (1986).
<br />I
<br />The open meeting law requires that meetings of the governing
<br />body of any city shall generally be open to the public. Minn. Stat.
<br />§471.705, subd. 1 (1990), Any person who violates the open
<br />meeting law "shall be subject to personal liability in the form of a
<br />civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $100 for a single occur.
<br />rence."' Minn. Star. § 471.705, subd. 2 (1990) (emphasis added).
<br />This court, has already held that appellants violated the open
<br />meeting law. Thuma; 506 N.W.2d at 19. We also affirmed that the,
<br />violation was unintentional. Id. .
<br />The Municipal Tort Liability Act peovides:
<br />Indemnification required. [Subject to the statutory max
<br />- \imums contained in -section 466.041, a municipality or an
<br />- instrumentality of a municipality shall defend and indem.
<br />nify any of its officers and employees, whether elective or
<br />appo ntive, for damages, including punitive damages,,
<br />claimed or levied against the officer or employee, provided
<br />that the officer or employee: .
<br />(1) was -acting in the performance of the duties of the
<br />position; and
<br />(2 was not guilty of malfeasance in office, willful neglect
<br />of?duty, or bad faith.
<br />Minn. Stat. § 466.07, subd.1 (1990) (emphasis added).
<br />The trial court concluded that the duty of a municipality to defend
<br />and indemnify'
<br />'The claim here is for reimbursement of the costs of defense, not for
<br />indemnification of the $100 civil penalty. Its employees under section 466.07 does not extend to the Thuma
<br />action because that action, alleging violations of the open meeting
<br />law, was not a claim for "damages" or "punitive damages." The
<br />plaintiff in the Thuma action sought imposition of a "civil penalty"
<br />under Minn: Star. § 471.705, subd. 2 (1990). The trial court con-
<br />cluded that the "civil penalty" was not analogous to "damages," as
<br />referred to in section 466.07, and the duty of the city to defend its
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