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employees under section 466.07 did not extend to the Thuma <br />action. We agree. <br />Prior to 1987, a municipality had a duty to defend and indemnify <br />Its employees against any "tort claim or demand." Minn. $tat. § <br />466.07 (1086). Section 466.07 was amended in 1987, however, to <br />remove the word "tort" from that phrase. 1987 Minn. Laws ch. 79, <br />§ 2. As amended, section 466.07 provides that a municipality must <br />defend and indemnify its employees against any claim for <br />"damages, including punitive damages." Minn. Stat. `§ 466.07 <br />(1990). <br />Appellants argue that removal of the word "tort" by the 1987 <br />amendment was intended to broaden a municipality's duty to defend <br />and indemnify its employees. That may be true, but we are not <br />persuaded that the duty was extended to reach this kind of case. The <br />attorney general has specifically rejected that contention; <br />Indeed, while the 1987 amendment deletes the reference to <br />"tort," itspecifically incorporates the notion that the defense <br />and indemnification requirements are directed to actions for <br />"damages." <br />As noted in [Op. Ally. Gen. 471-a (April 29,1983)], an action to <br />impose sanctions under the Open Meeting Law is wholly unrelated <br />to the establishment of monetary damages. Yii Thus, ►tcontinues <br />to be our view that Minn. StaL § 466.07 does not expressly <br />provide authority for defense and indemnification of officers <br />charged personally with Open Meeting I.aw violations, ' <br />Op. Att'y Gen. 471-a (Dec. 31,1992) (emphasis added). . <br />One of the legislature's reasons for requiring indemnification of <br />municipal employees for damage claims was to reduce the risk that <br />employees would be burdened with damage awards. Hearing on <br />S.F. No. 53 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 2, <br />1987).. We do not believe the $100 civil penalty under the open <br />meeting jaw is the type of personal expense the legislature was <br />concerned about when it enacted the indemnification law, or the <br />1987 amendment to it. <br />Appellants also attempt to characterize the civil penalty in the <br />open meeting law as punitive damages. As such, appellants argue, <br />the city must defend them under section,466.07. We conclude, <br />however, for several reasons, that civil penalties do not constitute <br />punitive damages. First, punitive damages are allowed only where <br />the harm complained of is the result of "deliberate disregard for the <br />rights or safety of others." Minn. Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1(a) (1990). <br />But a civil penalty is called for under the open meeting law even <br />when, as here, the violation was unintentional. Thurna, 506 <br />N. W.2d at 19. Second, punitive damages are awarded to a plaintiff; <br />a civil penalty'is awarded to the government (in this case, the city). <br />Appellants also argue that there is no rational public policy basis <br />to maintain that a violation of the open meeting law is not entitled <br />to defense by the municipality, while at the same time requiring a <br />municipality to defend a public official or employee accused of <br />unlawful discrimination, violations of civil. rights, sexual harass- <br />ment, or police brutality. We conclude, however, that the wrongs <br />referred to by appellants are directed against individuals (or groups <br />of individuals) who, as victims, are allowed to seek compensatory <br />and/or punitive damages for themselves, whereas an open meeting <br />violation is more property viewed as a wrong directed at society as <br />a whole. Thuma, as an individual plaintiff, could not seek damages <br />as compensation for herself for an open meeting violation. Cf. <br />Grossman Y. School Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 389 N.W.2d <br />532, 536 (Minn. App. 1986) (Complaint. alleging open meeting <br />violations.must seek "civil penalty," not to exceed $100 to be paid <br />to plaintiff himself, rather than "damages" of $100.). The whole <br />purpose is deterrence. <br />We hold that the city has no duty under section 466.07 to defend <br />or reimburse appellants for costs and attorney fees incurred in <br />defense of the Thuma action. <br />Minn. Star. § 465.76 (1990) provides: <br />If reimbursement is requested by the officer or employee, <br />• the governing body of a home rule charter or statutory city <br />or county may; after consultation with its legal counsel, <br />reimburse a city or county officer or employee for any costs <br />and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the person to <br />defend charges of a criminal nature brought against the <br />person that arose out of the reasonable and lawful perfor- <br />mance of duties for the city or county. <br />(Emphasis added.) <br />The trial court concluded that appellants are not entitled to rein <br />bursement of their attorney fees under Minn. Star. §.465.76 becout <br />(1) allegations of a violation of the open meeting law are not chargr <br />of a "criminal nature," and (2) the allegations did not arise out of it <br />lawful performance by appellants'of their duties. <br />We recognize that a violation of the open meeting law is not <br />criminal act and that the statutory penalty is a "civil penalty." Min <br />Stat. § 471.705, subd. 2.. We also recognize that the safeguan <br />normally afforded a criminal defendant are not applicable in dete <br />mining whether a violation has occurred. Nevertheless, we do n <br />believe the legislature required defense of officials in suits f <br />damages under section 466.07 and permitted their defense, and <br />section 465.76, against criminal charges that could result in incz <br />ceration, yet intended to bar reimbursement of defense costs <br />actions seeking a civil fine. <br />The attorney general has opined that "the authority of cities <br />reimburse officers for criminal defense may be construed to inclu <br />as well defense of allegations of violation of the Open Meed <br />Law." Op. Att'y Gen. 471-a (Dec. 31, 1992). We agree. 'I <br />attorney general opinion goes on, however, to state a propositi <br />with which we do not fully.agree--that in "virtually all cases <br />would be required] that [the] officer not be guilty of the violatl <br />charged If reimbursement is to be granted," Id. That is, if a violat: <br />is found to have occurred, according to the attorney general <br />cannot then be said that the allegation of violation of the bl <br />meeting law "arose out of the reasonable and lawful performan <br />of public duties. But it has been established in this case tl <br />although appellants violated the open meeting law, the violation v <br />unintentional. In such a circumstance, we find the condurt to <br />within the "reasonable and lawful performance of publk I <br />within the meaning of section 465.76. The violation was a) ... piy <br />unfortunate misstep --a stumble --while the azppellants went about <br />performance of legitimate public services. <br />a We do not address, however, the question of whether the statute we <br />allow payment of defense costs if the open meeting violation were wil <br />or intentional. • .. r <br />We conclude that the city may provide reimbursement pursuan <br />section 465.76. <br />Because the city council members who are disinterested in re <br />bursement is less ttian a quorum the council must paresent <br />reimbursement decision to a district court For approval. <br />3 Section 465.76 provides:.. <br />[Ilf lessthana quorum of the governing body is disinterested, <br />reimbursement shall be approved by a judge of the'district court. <br />(That may be unnecessary, however, in light of our decisior <br />MLCIT liability that follows in part III.) We remand to the dis <br />court. <br />M. <br />Under the covenant issued to the city by MLCIT, MLCIT h <br />duty to defend and indemnify city officials in suits arising from l <br />errors and omissions in performing city duties, except that <br />MLCIT's duty to pay on behalf of or to .indemnify a <br />"covered party" other than the "city" shall not apply to any <br />-" act, error or omission: <br />d. For which the "city" is not authorized to Indemnify <br />any person bav statute. <br />(Emphasis added ) <br />4 The provision in its entirety reads: <br />MLCIT's duty to pay on behalf of or to indemnify a "wvered( " <br />than the "city shall not apply to any act, error or omission: - <br />a.Which constitutes malfeasance in office; or <br />b. Which constitutes willful neglect of duty; or <br />c.Which constitutes bad faith; or <br />d. For which the "city" is not authorized to indemnify any person by st <br />or 1.- <br />51 <br />All opinions since 109 can be faxed. Ca,'IM <br />