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owners, builders, and/or the final property owner. Impact fees apply to both residential and non-residential <br />development, and may cover a wide range of service improvements, such as roads, parks, and public safety.8 <br />More specifically, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 560 N.W.2d 681, 685 (Minn. 1997), stated <br />that an impact fee is a form of development exaction possessing the following characteristics: <br />· In the form of a predetermined money payment. <br />· Assessed as a condition to the issuance of a building permit, an occupancy permit or plat approval. <br />· Pursuant to local government powers to regulate new growth and development and provide for adequate public <br />facilities and services. <br />· Levied to fund large-scale, off-site public facilities and services necessary to serve new development. <br />· In an amount which is proportionate to the need for the public facilities generated by new development.9 <br />Country Joe further noted the difference between an impact fee and a special assessment: <br />‘The primary difference is that special assessments represent a measure of the benefit of public improvements on new or <br />existing development, whereas impact fees typically measure the cost of the demand or need for public facilities as a <br />result of new development only.’10 <br />Just as special assessments are constitutionally constrained to be no greater than the special benefit conferred on the <br />properties that are assessed, so, too, are impact fees, as a form of exaction, constitutionally limited. The U.S. Supreme Court in <br />Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 319 (1994), established that an <br />unconstitutional taking occurs unless it can be shown that (a) there is an essential nexus between the exaction required and the <br />state interest being advanced (Nollan), and (b) there is a rough proportionality between the exaction and the impact of the <br />proposed development project (Dolan).11 <br />As of June 2005, 25 states had adopted impact fee enabling legislation allowing local governments to establish and collect such <br />fees.12 Minnesota is not one of these states. In the absence of enabling legislation, what authority then, if any, does a <br />Minnesota city have to adopt impact fees? The Minnesota Supreme Court avoided answering this question in Country Joe, but <br />the Court’s reasoning suggests that there is no such authority under current Minnesota law. <br />In Country Joe, building contractors challenged the legality of a road unit connection charge adopted by the City of Eagan. The <br />charge grew out of a study by the city’s consulting engineers projecting that the city would suffer a shortfall of over one million <br />dollars to finance major street construction. The city council adopted the road unit connection charge payable as a condition to <br />issuance of all building permits in the city. The city made a threefold argument in defending against the contractors’ challenge to <br />the road unit connection charge: (a) the charge was a lawful exercise of its implied powers under Minnesota law, (b) the charge <br />was a lawful impact fee, and (c) the charge was a lawful exercise of the city’s police powers. <br />The Supreme Court first rejected the city’s argument that the road unit connection charge was a lawful exercise of the city’s <br />implied municipal planning authority under the Municipal Planning Act, Minn. Stat. Ch. 462.13 The Court stated that because <br />Eagan was a statutory city, it had no inherent powers beyond those expressly conferred. Furthermore, “[t]hat the Municipal <br />Planning Act expressly confers broad municipal planning powers on cities does not necessarily imply that the legislature <br />similarly intended to confer broad financing powers under the act.” The Court pointed out that the Legislature had expressly <br />provided for sewer and water charges (after which the city had modeled its road unit connection charges), but had not <br />expressly provided for road charges.14 Significantly, for purposes of discussion further below, the Court also observed <br />[t]hat this lack of express statutory authorization was not the result of legislative oversight is evidenced by statutory <br />provisions expressly establishing special assessments as the mechanism by which cities are empowered to finance road <br />improvements. See Minn. Stat. §§ 429.021, subd. 1(1), 412.221, subd. 6.15 <br />For these reasons, the Court concluded that “the authority to impose a road unit connection charge cannot be implied from the <br />city’s municipal planning authority.”