Order-Other - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

7 court may remove a charter commissioner for any reason as long as the reason is stated in the court’s order. (Pet’r’s Final Argument, Aug. 12, 2019 at 1.) The court disagrees. Petitioner’s position would permit any minor disagreement, slight, or perceived slight to become the basis for filing a petition for removal. Petitioner’s interpretation of the statute could produce a stampede to the courthouse by disgruntled citizens or elected officials and, ironically, produce a much more severe paralysis of charter commission business than anything alleged in the present Petition. Instead, based on guidance from the Minnesota Supreme Court, the court concludes that a legally valid reason for removal must be premised upon “sufficient cause” or “good cause”. In State ex rel. Hart v, Common Council of City of Duluth, the court reviewed an attempt by the Common Council of the City of Duluth to remove the city’s three Fire Commissioners. 53 Minn. 238, 55 N.W. 118 (1893) (Mitchell, J.). In the absence of a statutory standard for testing the legal validity of the removal, the court adopted a “cause” or “sufficient cause” standard by which to determine whether the removals were “sufficient in law.” Id. at 244, 55 N.W. at 120. Justice Mitchell stated: “cause,” or “sufficient cause,” means “legal cause,” and not any cause which the council may think sufficient. The cause must be one which specially relates to and affects the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. The causes must be one touching the qualifications of the officer or his performance of its duties, showing that he is not a fit or proper person to hold the office. An attempt to remove an officer for any cause not affecting his competency or fitness would be an excess of power, and equivalent to an arbitrary removal. In the absence of any statutory specification the sufficiency of the cause should be determined with reference to the character of the office, and the qualifications necessary to fill it. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently applied Justice Mitchell’s definition of “cause” when determining the validity of a termination pursuant to a civil service statute that permitted employee discipline only for “just cause.” Hagen v. Civil Service Bd., 282 Minn. 296, 298-99, 164 N.W.2d 629, 631-32 (1969) (quoting Hart; upholding termination of employee who was