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employees were ordered to remove them. ,.. Vincent sought an injunction against the removal of his campaign signs,but the request was denied by the District ' ►� � ;�y> . Court, which concluded that the ordinance was constitu- tional. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the or- 4 F dinance was presumptively unconstitutional because significant First Amendment interests were involved and the city had failed to make a sufficient showing that its asserted ; i interests in aesthetics and in preventing visual clutter were sufficient to justify a total.ban. The Supreme Court reversed again, upholding the or- dinance.The Court stressed the neutrality of the ordinance n-'=r in its opinion.The ordinance did not regulate speech or ex- pression in a way that favored some ideas or expressions at the expense of others;the prohibition applied to all signs or ..r��,•_,.. . posters of whatever nature.The Court reasoned further that the city's interest in aesthetic concerns, specifically in avoiding visual clutter, was substantial and that the total ban was the least suppressive way to protect that interest. Importantly, the Court again refused to place a heavy _ r burden on the city to prove that the signs actually would cause harm to its interest in promoting an aesthetic standard. In addition,the Vincent decision can certainly be read as strong support on the Supreme Court for the proposition a ~ that a community's interest in preserving or promoting an aesthetic standard is in itself a substantial interest justifying `^< � strong sign regulation.Finally,and importantly, since the prohibition in Vincent was content neutral, the Court viewed the restriction on First Amendment rights to be one of time,place,and manner.When the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of expression (the content ' neutrality of a prohibition makes it presumptively so),the regulation must further a substantial governmental interest and be no greater than is necessary to achieve that objective. This is essentially the same, more relaxed review given to `z commercial speech by the test set forth in Central Hudson. In other situations in which noncommercial speech is - regulated, a much heavier burden is placed upon the - regulator.The presumption against constitutionality is more Los Angeles's ban on the posting of signs, including political severe and the governmental interest must be compelling in signs, on utility poles was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. order to sustain the regulation. Perhaps Chicago should institute such a ban. The election In its most recent review of a regulation restricting First involving these candidates has been long over—and they lost. Amendment rights,the Court arguably has relaxed even fur- ther the Central Hudson test used to measure the validity of Another recent decision of the Supreme Court may have restrictions on commercial speech.In Board of Trustees of implications for sign regulations, particularly for com- the State University of New York v. Fox, U.S. munities that regulate on the basis of distinctions in the con- 109 S.Ct.3028(1989), the Court remanded to the tent of the message. In City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer lower court an action challenging a university regulation Publishing Co.,486 U.S.750, 108 S.Ct.2138(1988),a news- prohibiting private commercial enterprises from soliciting paper publisher challenged a local ordinance that required on campus—in this case, in student dormitories. At issue licenses for coin-operated newsracks as a prerequisite to was whether the fourth part of the Central Hudson test ac- placement of the machines on the city's sidewalks.The or- tually requires that the government prove that it has dinance granted licensing authority to the mayor(subject to regulated no more extensively than is necessary to serve the payment of a fee).Newsracks had to comply with architec- interest it seeks to advance.The Court ruled that the means tural controls,and,in effect,meet whatever other conditions need not be the best and least restrictive way to achieve those the mayor might impose.In ruling the ordinance unconstit tl- ends,but they must be"proportionate to the interest sought tional on First Amendment grounds,the Court held, in part: to be advanced." The Court used this phrase as an alter- The absence of express standards makes it difficult to native way of expressing its ruling that regulation must be distinguish"as applied,"between a licensor',lel itimate denial entirely reasonable.The more important the governmental of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial powt-r.Stan- interest to be achieved, the more likely it is that judicial Bards pro%-ide the guideposts that check the licensor and allow review will be tolerant of a regulation that is not,perhaps, axuts quickly and easily to determine whether the liL V1110 1.i1 the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. discriminating against disfa�.•ored speech.(108 S.Ct.at 214-1) 20