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tions on commercial speech, as restated by the Court in Metromedia, is outlined in its four parts here: (1)The First Amendment protects*commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it(2)seeks to implement a substantial governmental in- terest,(3)directly advances that interest,and(4)reaches no AVAILABLE 66.7500 farther than necessary to accomplish the given objective.(69 s. L.Ed.2d.at 814-815)(Numbers indicating the parts of the test have been added for clarification.) This rule, as reaffirmed in Metromedia, is important to ' local governments concerned about tighter and more effec- tive regulation of on-premises commercial signs.Commer- ; cial speech is protected by the First Amendment. While ti regulation of commercial speech does not receive the degree ( ' of scrutiny that regulation of noncommercial speech does, it is subject to review and must not run afoul of the four-part test set forth. It is unclear whether clear and convincing evidence of the relationship between governmental interest and a regulation would be necessary to prove the validity of a regulation _ governing commercial signs only.The Metromedia Court indulged the city by requiring no real proof of the relation- ship between the purposes and the regulations involved in the specific situation before the Court,a situation that also included regulation of noncommercial speech.However,a " local government contemplating additional restrictions on This commercial message—a sign for a sign on a sign—is not commercial on-premises signs should be mindful of the Cen- entitled to the same protection from regulation as is tral Hudson requirement that commercial speech restrictions noncommercial speech. But local regulations must not run afoul "directly"advance the governmental interest being served. of the four-part test iterated in Central Hudson and reiterated in In Metromedia,one justice expressed doubt that a regula- Metromedia. tion prohibiting commercial billboards,but allowing non- commercial billboards, would be constitutional. His concern was with the issues of censorship and prior restraint business. The Court noted the presence of several factors that may arise in the application of such regulations when (namely,the speech under review advertised a company,it local officials must at some point—whether in the process referred to a specific product, and the speaker had some of issuing permits or in the process of enforcement— economic motivation in putting it forth)and reasoned that determine whether a sign is commercial or noncommercial. the content of the message was commercial. The Court Based on the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it noted that no single factor rendered the speech commercial is,in fact,difficult to distinguish between a commercial and but that the combination of all such factors did.A commu- a noncommercial sign. In Central Hudson, the Court nity that regulates signs on the basis of the commercial or defined commercial speech as"expression related solely to noncommercial content of the message portrayed will, in the commercial interests of the speaker and its audience." some cases,have to decide which regulation applies by con- Using this definition,a sign that reads"American Steel Sup- sidering these various factors and then trying to discern the ports Foreign Trade Restrictions,Buy American"is arguably weight the courts might give to each factor. ` not a commercial sign and should be permitted in some loca- The Supreme Court in Metromedia clarified the law of tion.The Metromedia decision does not answer the ques- sign regulation to the extent that there is now a firm legal tion,Is a sign commercial if it appears that its intent,at least basis for restrictive sign regulation. Even though the or- in part, is to advertise some commercial activity7 dinance in San Diego was declared invalid, the plurality In a more recent case, Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products opinion concluded that a community may, without Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 103 S.Ct. 2875 (1983), the Supreme violating the First Amendment, ban all billboards (off- Court was required once again to define commercial speech. premises signs)carrying a commercial message.Justice Bren- Instead of using the definition quoted above from Central nan complained that the import of the ruling would be bifur- Hudson,the Court decided that a number of factors,rather cated billboard regulations that prohibit commercial than a strict definition, must be considered in making the messages but allow noncommercial messages. That is ex- determination.The analysis begins with the basic notion— actly what has happened in many communities. set down by the Court some years before—that commercial The Supreme Court's decision in Vincent is also significant speech is"speech which does no more than propose a com- in this context.In that case,the high court upheld a Los An- mercial transaction."However,the speech before the Court geles ordinance banning the attachment of signs to utility in Bolger, like that used in the American Steel example, poles. Vincent was a candidate for political office who could not be characterized solely as a proposal to transact sought to attach small campaign posters to utility poles.City 19