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agreement the same day it executed the sale with the Village. If the allegations of the Complaint <br />are considered facts, LGP rejected Aeon’s purchase agreement despite Aeon’s compliance with <br />subdivision 6—which mandates LGP to accept the agreement with Aeon. Since subdivision 9 <br />closes the door on Plaintiffs’ ability of purchase the Park, completing the sale the same day as <br />rejecting the right of first refusal leaves Plaintiffs with no time to bring suit to force the sale to <br />Aeon. This Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ characterization of the property right and its <br />deprivation. <br />First, a right of first refusal or a cause of action may be a recognized property interest. Id. <br />(cause of action); Crowell v. Delafield Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 737, 740 (Minn. <br />1990) (right of first refusal). However, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the property interest granted by <br />the legislature here. Prior to the enactment of section 327C.095 manufactured homeowners did <br />not have a right of first refusal. They also did not have a cause of action for a violation of that <br />right of first refusal. The statute that granted them both the right of first refusal and the cause of <br />action limits that cause of action. When they were authorized the right of first refusal <br />manufactured homeowners were simultaneously limited to sue only for damages. The legislature <br />did not grant them a property interest and then later enact additional legislation that foreclosed <br />their ability to vindicate that property interest. <br />This is distinguished from the case on which Plaintiffs rely. See, Logan, 455 U.S. 422. In <br />Logan, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[w]hile the legislature may elect not to confer a <br />property interest , . . it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once <br />conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.” Id. at 432. Logan involved a state statutory <br />scheme that precluded an employee from bringing a suit for wrongful termination due to a 120- <br />day limitation. Id. The employee had no ability to bring a suit after the period expired. Id. This <br />43