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case is distinguished for three reasons. <br />First, in a thoughtful and discerning legislative action, the legislature gave Plaintiffs a cause <br />of action for a violation of their right of first refusal while specifically maintaining that <br />manufactured homeowners are not entitled to purchase the Park after the sale.4 It did not grant <br />them an unfettered ability to purchase the property, nor a vested interest in the actual property. <br />The right was not given and then taken away. This distinction makes clear that the property interest <br />that was actually provided by the state is not deprived. Plaintiffs were granted a cause of action for <br />the violation of their right of first refusal. Under the facts alleged in this case, they were not granted <br />any further property interest. Plaintiffs are now suing under that cause of action. They are able to <br />vindicate their right to the cause of action and recover damages for any violation of that right. This <br />is the sole property interest granted by the legislature. They are able to, as they currently are, seek <br />damages for the violation of subdivision 6. <br />Second, the Court in Logan states that a post-deprivation hearing is constitutionally <br />adequate if “necessity of quick action” or the “impracticality of providing any pre-deprivation <br />process” exists. Id. at 436 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981). Here, that necessity <br />exists. Balanced against Plaintiffs’ rights are Defendants’ right to their property and their right to <br />free alienability of their property. The legislature balanced the rights of both manufactured <br />homeowners and real property owners in devising §327C.095. The homeowners have the chance <br />to purchase the property and have a cause of action for a violation of that chance while property <br />owners are still able to sell their property within a reasonable time. Any additional interest carved <br />out of the landowner’s property by statute would likely lead to a question of unconstitutional taking <br />from the property owner. See Manufactured Hous. Communities of Washington v. State, 13 P.3d <br />4 Quite simply put, the legislature enacted a remedial statute, and then expressly defined the remedy. <br />44