My WebLink
|
Help
|
About
|
Sign Out
Home
Browse
Search
CC PACKET 10112016
StAnthony
>
City Council
>
City Council Packets
>
2016
>
CC PACKET 10112016
Metadata
Thumbnails
Annotations
Entry Properties
Last modified
10/7/2016 10:40:24 AM
Creation date
10/7/2016 10:36:54 AM
Metadata
There are no annotations on this page.
Document management portal powered by Laserfiche WebLink 9 © 1998-2015
Laserfiche.
All rights reserved.
/
93
PDF
Print
Pages to print
Enter page numbers and/or page ranges separated by commas. For example, 1,3,5-12.
After downloading, print the document using a PDF reader (e.g. Adobe Reader).
View images
View plain text
183, 196 (Wash. 2000) (“We have found that the statutory grant of a right of first refusal to tenants <br />of mobile home parks, amounts to a taking and transfer of private property without a judicial <br />determination of public necessity and without just compensation having been first paid.”). This is <br />the balance that is struck. Unlike Logan, a post-deprivation hearing is constitutionally valid. See <br />Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64–65(1979) (post-termination hearing permitted). <br />Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the 45-day period was not adequate to allow them to purchase <br />the property or bring a suit. See Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913). Under the <br />statute, however, Plaintiffs could have made an offer prior to the close of the 45-day period in <br />order to see whether the offer would be rejected—presumably in violation of subdivision 6—and <br />then been able to bring suit prior to the close of the sale to the Village. The language of the statute <br />is clear that any right to the purchase is foreclosed after the sale of the Park, after the 45-day notice <br />period. Plaintiffs did not have zero days as they argue. <br />Plaintiffs’ due process rights are not violated. The legislature did not grant them an <br />unfettered ability to purchase the Park. They were not deprived of that right because it was never, <br />in fact, granted to them. <br />II. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL DECLARATORY SUMMARY <br />JUDGMENT <br /> <br />A. Summary judgment standard. <br /> <br />Rule 56.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure establishes the standard for summary <br />judgment: <br />Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to <br />interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show <br />that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is <br />entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. <br /> <br />Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. In a summary judgment motion, the facts are viewed in a light most <br />favorable to the non-moving party. Offerdahl v. Univ. of Minn. Hosp. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, <br />45
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.