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FINANCE AND COMMERCE APPELLATE COURTS EDMON <br />e, Which constitutes dishonesty on the part of a "covered party;" or <br />`f. Which constitutes the willful violation of a statute or ordinance by any <br />f6cial, employee, or agent of the "city." <br />'The terms "malfeasance," "willful neglect of duty," and "bad faith" <br />shall be given the same meaning in this covenant as given in the <br />applicable statute with respect to the "city's" duty to defend or <br />indemnify its official, employees or agents. <br />The coverage afforded by the covenant thus parallels the city's <br />statutory duty and authority to defend and to reimburse; and, be- <br />cause the city may (under our holding in part II) reimburse <br />appellants' defense costs pursuant to section 465.76, we conclude <br />that MLCIT has a concomitant duty under the covenant to reimburse <br />appellants for the costs and attorney fees they incurred in defense <br />of the Thuma action (in the absence of malfeasance, etc.). <br />We note, however, that MLCIT does not have a duty to indemnify <br />for the $100 penalties imposed against each appellant because the <br />policy specifically excludes coverage for "fines or penalties Im- <br />posed by law.", Furthermore, In addition to the exclusion in the <br />covenant, the open meeting law explicitly calls for "personal <br />liability" for the $100 civil penalty. Minn. Stat. § 471.705, subd. I <br />IV: <br />The trial court granted attorney fees in the amount of $500 for <br />each respondent. The district court has broad discretion in awarding <br />,fees. Solon v. Soloa, 255 N.W,2d 395, 397 (1977). Appellants do <br />not dispute that respondents had to appear twice due to appellant's <br />actions. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in awarding <br />attorney fees to respondents under these circumstances, <br />DECISION <br />The city does not have a duty to defend and reimburse under Minn. <br />Stat. § 466.07 (1990) for costs and attorney fees incurred by appel- <br />lants In their defense of the Thuma action. The city may, however, <br />)under Minn. Star, § 465.76 (1990), provide reimbursement for <br />attorney fees and other defense costs. Because less than a quorum <br />of the city council is disinterested in this matter, approval of any <br />reimbursement decision must be sought from a district court., <br />Under the terms of the covenant issued by MLCIT to the city, <br />MLC1T has a duty to defend and, therefore, to reimburse for the cost <br />of defending. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in <br />awarding attorney fees in the amount of $500 to each respondent. <br />Affirmed in -part, reversed In part, and remanded. <br />Blue Earth County <br />Lansing, Judge <br />District Court rlCX911921 <br />Willard T. Dorn, et. al„ <br />Michael D. Schwartz <br />David E. Wandling <br />Appellants, <br />Michael D. Schwartz, P.A. <br />Suite 230 <br />12900 Whitewater Drive <br />Minneapolis, MN 55343 <br />VS. <br />John Peterson, Individually <br />Bailey W. Blethen <br />and in his capacity as an - <br />- Blelhen, Gage & Krause <br />Employee of H & C Electric <br />127 South Second Street <br />Supply Company, et, al., <br />P.O. Box 3049 <br />Mankato, MN 56001 <br />Respondents. <br />Filed: March 8,1994 <br />Office of Appellate Courts <br />SYLLABUS <br />I, There is no age ceiling on the Minnesota Human Rights Act's <br />MARCH 11, 1994 <br />prohibition against discharge based on age, but the Act permits an <br />exemption for a mandatory retirement age established by law or an <br />employer's published retirement policy if it is established consistent <br />with Minn. Stat. § 181.81 (1990). <br />II. An employer's statement to the Department of Jobs and <br />Training in response to an employee's claim for unemployment <br />benefits is absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis for a <br />defamation action both because the response is an integral part of a <br />quasi-judicial proceeding and because the response is required by <br />statute. <br />. Affirmed in part and reversed In part. <br />Considered and decided by Norton, Presiding Judge, Lansing, <br />Judge, Forsberg, Judge. <br />OPINION <br />LANSING, Judge (Hon. James D. Mason, District Court Trial <br />Judge) <br />This appeal raises the question of whether the Minnesota Human <br />Rights Act protects employees seventy years of age and older <br />against discharge based on age. We hold that Minn. Stat. § 363,03, <br />subd. I (2)(b) (1990) prohibits discharge based on agewith no upper <br />age limit, but Minn. Stat. § 363.02, subd. 6 (1990)allows an exemp- <br />tion for a mandatory retirement age to be established by law or by <br />an employer's published retirement policy if it is established con- <br />sistent with Minn, Star. § 181.81 (1990). This appeal also requires <br />us to determine whether an employer's submission to the Depart- <br />ment of Jobs and Training of reasons for discharge Is absolutely or <br />qualifiedly privileged for purposes of a defamation action. We <br />conclude that within the context of the unemployment compensa- <br />tion claim procedure, an employer's statement of reasons for dis- <br />charge is absolutely privileged. <br />FACTS. <br />H & C Electric Supply Company employed Willard Dorn from <br />1960 to 1991 and John Hoerr from 1980 to 1991. Both employees <br />were discharged in 1991 by John Peterson, general manager for <br />H & C Electric. At the time of discharge Dorn was seventy-nine <br />years old and Hoerr was seventy-eight years old. H & C Electric <br />did not have a mandatory retirement policy. Peterson stated that <br />Dom and Hoerr were discharged for deficient performance. Dom <br />and Hoerr claim that Peterson told them that the discharge was <br />because of their age. <br />Both Dom and Hoerr applied for unemployment benefits. Peter- <br />son,. in response to an inquiryfrom the Department of Jobs and <br />Training, wrote a letter saying that he had terminated Hoerr so other <br />more qualified employees could advance, that Hoerr's termination <br />had nothing to do with his age, that Hoerr had difficulty using H & <br />C Electrie's computer system, and that Hoerr had held his position <br />as buyer because of H & C Electric's prior owners. Peterson wrote <br />a separate letter stating that Dom was terminated because his <br />,productivity had decreased over the past eight to ten years, that Dorn <br />could not provide some services other buyers could, and that he, like <br />Hoerr, had kept his job because of his personal relationship with the <br />prior owners, Audrey Roden, Peterson's secretary, typed the letters, <br />and Bob Stark, H & C Electric's plant manager, knew the letters' <br />contents. <br />Dom and Hoerr brought this action claiming (1) age discrimina- <br />tion under Minn. Star. § 363.03, subd. 1 (2)(b) (1990), and (2) <br />defamation based on Peterson's statements to the Department of <br />Jobs and Training. The district court held that Dorn and Hoerr were <br />not protected from age discrimination under the Minnesota Human <br />Rights Act and that Peterson's statements were privileged. The <br />district court entered summary judgment against Dorn and Hoerr <br />and they appeal. <br />ISSUES <br />I. Does Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd, 1 (2)(b) (1990) protect <br />employees seventy years of age or older from discharge based on <br />age? <br />IL Is an employer's response' to a specific inquiry from the <br />Department of Jobs and Training relating to an employee's claim <br />for unemployment benefits protected by absolute or qualified <br />