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FINANCE AND COMMERCE APPELLATE COURTS EDMON e, Which constitutes dishonesty on the part of a "covered party;" or `f. Which constitutes the willful violation of a statute or ordinance by any f6cial, employee, or agent of the "city." 'The terms "malfeasance," "willful neglect of duty," and "bad faith" shall be given the same meaning in this covenant as given in the applicable statute with respect to the "city's" duty to defend or indemnify its official, employees or agents. The coverage afforded by the covenant thus parallels the city's statutory duty and authority to defend and to reimburse; and, be- cause the city may (under our holding in part II) reimburse appellants' defense costs pursuant to section 465.76, we conclude that MLCIT has a concomitant duty under the covenant to reimburse appellants for the costs and attorney fees they incurred in defense of the Thuma action (in the absence of malfeasance, etc.). We note, however, that MLCIT does not have a duty to indemnify for the $100 penalties imposed against each appellant because the policy specifically excludes coverage for "fines or penalties Im- posed by law.", Furthermore, In addition to the exclusion in the covenant, the open meeting law explicitly calls for "personal liability" for the $100 civil penalty. Minn. Stat. § 471.705, subd. I IV: The trial court granted attorney fees in the amount of $500 for each respondent. The district court has broad discretion in awarding ,fees. Solon v. Soloa, 255 N.W,2d 395, 397 (1977). Appellants do not dispute that respondents had to appear twice due to appellant's actions. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in awarding attorney fees to respondents under these circumstances, DECISION The city does not have a duty to defend and reimburse under Minn. Stat. § 466.07 (1990) for costs and attorney fees incurred by appel- lants In their defense of the Thuma action. The city may, however, )under Minn. Star, § 465.76 (1990), provide reimbursement for attorney fees and other defense costs. Because less than a quorum of the city council is disinterested in this matter, approval of any reimbursement decision must be sought from a district court., Under the terms of the covenant issued by MLCIT to the city, MLC1T has a duty to defend and, therefore, to reimburse for the cost of defending. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees in the amount of $500 to each respondent. Affirmed in -part, reversed In part, and remanded. Blue Earth County Lansing, Judge District Court rlCX911921 Willard T. Dorn, et. al„ Michael D. Schwartz David E. Wandling Appellants, Michael D. Schwartz, P.A. Suite 230 12900 Whitewater Drive Minneapolis, MN 55343 VS. John Peterson, Individually Bailey W. Blethen and in his capacity as an - - Blelhen, Gage & Krause Employee of H & C Electric 127 South Second Street Supply Company, et, al., P.O. Box 3049 Mankato, MN 56001 Respondents. Filed: March 8,1994 Office of Appellate Courts SYLLABUS I, There is no age ceiling on the Minnesota Human Rights Act's MARCH 11, 1994 prohibition against discharge based on age, but the Act permits an exemption for a mandatory retirement age established by law or an employer's published retirement policy if it is established consistent with Minn. Stat. § 181.81 (1990). II. An employer's statement to the Department of Jobs and Training in response to an employee's claim for unemployment benefits is absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis for a defamation action both because the response is an integral part of a quasi-judicial proceeding and because the response is required by statute. . Affirmed in part and reversed In part. Considered and decided by Norton, Presiding Judge, Lansing, Judge, Forsberg, Judge. OPINION LANSING, Judge (Hon. James D. Mason, District Court Trial Judge) This appeal raises the question of whether the Minnesota Human Rights Act protects employees seventy years of age and older against discharge based on age. We hold that Minn. Stat. § 363,03, subd. I (2)(b) (1990) prohibits discharge based on agewith no upper age limit, but Minn. Stat. § 363.02, subd. 6 (1990)allows an exemp- tion for a mandatory retirement age to be established by law or by an employer's published retirement policy if it is established con- sistent with Minn, Star. § 181.81 (1990). This appeal also requires us to determine whether an employer's submission to the Depart- ment of Jobs and Training of reasons for discharge Is absolutely or qualifiedly privileged for purposes of a defamation action. We conclude that within the context of the unemployment compensa- tion claim procedure, an employer's statement of reasons for dis- charge is absolutely privileged. FACTS. H & C Electric Supply Company employed Willard Dorn from 1960 to 1991 and John Hoerr from 1980 to 1991. Both employees were discharged in 1991 by John Peterson, general manager for H & C Electric. At the time of discharge Dorn was seventy-nine years old and Hoerr was seventy-eight years old. H & C Electric did not have a mandatory retirement policy. Peterson stated that Dom and Hoerr were discharged for deficient performance. Dom and Hoerr claim that Peterson told them that the discharge was because of their age. Both Dom and Hoerr applied for unemployment benefits. Peter- son,. in response to an inquiryfrom the Department of Jobs and Training, wrote a letter saying that he had terminated Hoerr so other more qualified employees could advance, that Hoerr's termination had nothing to do with his age, that Hoerr had difficulty using H & C Electrie's computer system, and that Hoerr had held his position as buyer because of H & C Electric's prior owners. Peterson wrote a separate letter stating that Dom was terminated because his ,productivity had decreased over the past eight to ten years, that Dorn could not provide some services other buyers could, and that he, like Hoerr, had kept his job because of his personal relationship with the prior owners, Audrey Roden, Peterson's secretary, typed the letters, and Bob Stark, H & C Electric's plant manager, knew the letters' contents. Dom and Hoerr brought this action claiming (1) age discrimina- tion under Minn. Star. § 363.03, subd. 1 (2)(b) (1990), and (2) defamation based on Peterson's statements to the Department of Jobs and Training. The district court held that Dorn and Hoerr were not protected from age discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act and that Peterson's statements were privileged. The district court entered summary judgment against Dorn and Hoerr and they appeal. ISSUES I. Does Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd, 1 (2)(b) (1990) protect employees seventy years of age or older from discharge based on age? IL Is an employer's response' to a specific inquiry from the Department of Jobs and Training relating to an employee's claim for unemployment benefits protected by absolute or qualified