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a little complex because it involves several steps.The start-
<br /> ing point of the justices'reasoning is that noncommercial
<br /> speech,including political,religious,social,and other forms
<br /> of expression, is entitled to a higher degree of protection
<br /> under the First Amendment than commercial speech,which
<br /> ri advertises or identifies businesses.Looking at the ordinance,
<br /> it was apparent that every business could have some form
<br /> of on-premises sign. The way the ordinance actually
<br /> worked, a few commercial signs were permitted off prem-
<br /> ises.Given the ordinance's definition of"on premises,"many
<br /> r types of noncommercial speech(e.g.,"Impeach the Mayor,"
<br /> poly "Support Your Favorite Church," "Protect the Whales")
<br /> 3'C'-,Ov,I KIREST F would have no "premises."Thus, someone advertising a
<br /> motel would have a greater opportunity to use signs than
<br /> someone supporting a particular candidate for governor.The
<br /> general ban on off-premises signs effectively banned(or at
<br /> least severely restricted)noncommercial signs.
<br /> In the process of reaching a decision,the Court addressed
<br /> J many of the secondary issues in sign regulation.Most of its
<br /> Ica answers to other questions about sign regulation favored
<br /> local governments and sign regulation in general.A plurality
<br /> of the Court and three of the dissenters agreed that,as a mat-
<br /> ter of law,billboards and other forms of outdoor signage are
<br /> t intended to divert,and do divert,a driver's attention from
<br /> the roadway.In their view,a city is not required to produce
<br /> evidence to support the claim that a sign regulation advances
<br /> its interest in traffic safety.Two of the justices who voted to
<br /> San Diego's sign regulations, which effectively banned strike down the ordinance would not conclude, without
<br /> noncommercial messages like this one, were challenged in the clear and convincing evidence, that the ordinance would
<br /> Metromedia case. The ordinance was struck down, but the U.S. promote traffic safety or was necessary for aesthetic reasons.
<br /> Supreme Court's ruling in the case provides a firm legal basis The majority view on the traffic issue is extremely impor-
<br /> for restrictive sign regulation. tant to regulators. Billboard companies have produced
<br /> studies that purport to show that outdoor signage creates no
<br /> traffic hazard.The Metromedia decision is authority for the
<br /> of that Court.It is followed by an examination of some very position that a community need not produce evidence to
<br /> recent decisions by United States Circuit Courts of Appeals prove that billboards are traffic hazards.As such,it can be
<br /> including decisions in two cases that involved challenges to argued that the Metromedia decision relieves the city of
<br /> complete prohibitions of portable signs.These appeals cases, what may be a difficult task—proving a substantial relation-
<br /> two of which the Supreme Court has refused to review,serve ship between the end sought(traffic safety)and the means
<br /> as good examples of the application of the reasoning used by used(sign regulations).
<br /> the Supreme Court in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San When achievement or protection of an aesthetic goal is the
<br /> Diego,453 U.S.490,101 S.Ct.2882(1981),'and Members primary end of a sign regulation,however,the city should
<br /> of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,466 U.S.789,104 still be prepared to introduce evidence of the relationship be-
<br /> S.Ct.2118(1984), (hereinafter Vincent),discussed below. tween.that end and the means used.It is easy for billboard
<br /> Metromedia is the leading Supreme Court case in the area companies to produce evidence of other eyesores in a com-
<br /> of sign regulation.In that case,the high court struck down munity and,on that basis,to argue that a city has arbitrarily
<br /> a city ordinance that imposed substantial restrictions on out- singled out billboards for control.The opinion of the Court
<br /> door signs. The ordinance distinguished between on- in Metromedia did not address whether aesthetics alone may
<br /> premises and off-premises signs. It permitted on-premises support sign regulations.However, the deference given to
<br /> commercial signs but forbade all off-premises signs, with the city's conclusion that signs present traffic hazards may
<br /> certain exceptions.As the Court noted in its opinion,most arguably be extended to its conclusions about the need to
<br /> noncommercial messages have no premises and,thus,were achieve or protect an aesthetic. Regulators should also be
<br /> effectively banned. mindful that the Supreme Court decision in Vincent,
<br /> Although unable to agree on a unified majority opinion, discussed below,clearly emphasized the importance of a rec-
<br /> six members of the Court did agree that the ordinance was ord that shows factual support for the sign classifications
<br /> invalid under the First Amendment.But the ordinance was employed by regulators.
<br /> not ruled invalid on the basis of its regulation of commer- The ruling in Metromedia emphasizes the importance of
<br /> cial speech,which,according to the justices, met constitu- a four-part test used to determine the validity of restrictions
<br /> tional requirements. Rather, it was the effective ban on on commercial speech.The test was developed by the Court
<br /> noncommercial signage that prompted the Court to in- one year earlier in Central Hudson v. Public Service
<br /> validate the regulation. Coimm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 553-556, 100 S.Ct. 2343 (1980).
<br /> The reasoning-of the decision, while straightforward, is The test,which is actually a rule against overbroad restric-
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